Coevolutionary Development: China as Demonstration
Term
Coevolutionary Development: China as Demonstration
Idea level
Application: Development
Definition
Coevolutionary Development: China as Demonstration refers to Yuen Yuen Ang’s use of reform-era China as a high-resolution empirical demonstration of her theory of Coevolutionary Development, rather than as an exceptional case. In How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, Ang shows how the Chinese state and economy mutually adapted over time across domains—economic structure, property rights, development strategies, bureaucratic incentives, types of corruption, and more—illustrating the theory’s logic in practice and in thick detail.
Sources
Empirical demonstration:
Ang, Yuen Yuen. How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (2016), Chapters 5 and 6 (China at local levels), Chapter 7 (cross-national)
Theoretical synthesis:
Ang, Yuen Yuen. “Adaptive Political Economy: Toward a New Paradigm.” World Politics (2024).
Genealogy
[Paradigm] AIM (Adaptive, Inclusive, Moral Political Economy)
→ [Pillar] Adaptive Political Economy (APE)
→ [Theory] Coevolutionary Development
→ [Application: Development] China as demonstration at both national and subnational levels
→ [Application] Forest Hill City: traced coevolution of markets, property rights, development strategies, bureaucratic incentives, types of corruption
Quotes
“My empirical approach generates multiple snapshots of reciprocal feedbacks between states and markets. When these snapshots are strung in sequence, it reveals a causal logic that integrates and yet departs sharply from the conclusions of conventional theories.”
— Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, Introduction (p. 11-12)
“To understand how development actually occurred in this locale [Forest Hill City], I map the steps of state-and-market coevolution, starting with the central decision to open markets in 1978. My analysis yields a simple but powerful conclusion: the institutions, policies, and state capabilities that promote growth evolve over the course of development, even within a single locale.”
“I will trace the coevolution of the structure of property rights and markets over three phases: (1) Prior to 1993, the assignment of partial property rights to collective enterprises; (2) After 1993, informal property rights protection through personal relationships between bureaucracy and businesses; (3) From 1998 onward, state efforts to formally protect private property and rein in bureaucratic predation.”
— Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, Chapter 5 (p. 142)